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I. INTRODUCTION
Indians in the United States were cut down by the tens of
thousands by Winchester repeating rifles and flashing cavalry
sabers. But north of the border there were no Indian wars.
Natives were simply stripped of their land-always
peacefully-assured that the queen loved them like children,
then shuffled off to reserves and forgotten.1
Loving them like children, the Crown denied the First Nations'
their autonomy and sovereignty. Loving them like children, the
Crown barred the cultural and political maturation of the First
Nations.4 Keeping the First Nations in a state of dependence, the
Crown has perpetuated a policy tantamount to the genocide
perpetrated by their southern brothers.
1. Colin Nickerson, Anger, Despair Deepen for Canada's Indians, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 2, 1997, at Al. This newspaper article points out some of the horrible conditions
resulting from reservation living:
An adolescent Indian in Canada is almost twice as likely to go to jail than to
graduate from high school. Some 30 percent of Indian homes lack plumbing
or running water, while 60 percent of reserve Indians are unemployed.
Children on Canada's reserves suffer from a plethora of afflictions ranging
from malnutrition to head lice. In Alberta, Indians make up only 5 percent of
the population but nearly 40 percent of the welfare recipients. On the poorest
reserves, alcoholism rages at pandemic levels. Rates of serious crime are by
far the highest in Canada.
Id. at Al.
2. European officials addressed First Nations' chiefs, "children," and the chiefs
called the European, "father." See, e.g., Regina v. Taylor and Williams [1981] 34 O.R. (2d)
360, 363 (Ont. Ct. App.) (recounting a council meeting between chiefs of six tribes and the
Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs).
3. Discussion of aboriginal peoples of Canada tends to use the term "First Nations."
Ralph W. Johnson, Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and United States Policy
Toward Indians, 66 WASH. L. REV. 643,645 (1991).
4. For a comprehensive survey of the history of First Nations in Canada, see OLIVE
PATRIcIA DICKASON, CANADA'S FIRST NATIONS: A HISTORY OF FOUNDING PEOPLES FROM
EARLIEST TIMES (1992).
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This psychological, social, and economic genocide-which is
by no means limited to Canada-stems in part from the west's
failure to read and identify the terms aboriginal and aboriginal
rights within a framework that fully and fairly incorporates
aboriginal perspectives related to community, property, and
history. The very notion of property as fee simple is, of course,
foreign to traditional aboriginal concepts of land. Additionally,
the historical theories that western courts apply in determining
continuous and exclusive possession of land and in construing
aboriginal title further distances today's legal decisions from
aboriginal perspectives. Specifically, western courts have looked
to the hard written facts found in such documentation as treaties
and journals kept by European trappers. This approach ignores
the many kinds of aboriginal histories, ranging from stories
passed down from generation to generation to customs and
celebrations.
Some would say that holding aside such histories is
inevitable and necessary to preserve the integrity of the Anglo-
American legal system. How could oral histories be reliable
evidence? How can a court determine title to land without a
showing of continuous and exclusive possession as documented
by written accounts?
In a series of remarkable opinions, the Supreme Court of
Canada has begun to answer these questions in a way that is
tending to recognize the independence, autonomy, and integrity
of Canada's First Nations.5 With these opinions, Canadian courts
have recognized that they cannot define "aboriginal rights" by
means of the traditional English property law paradigm.6
Instead, they define aboriginal rights as sui generis, as a special
kind of property created at the moment that Europeans asserted
sovereignty over land occupied by First Nations. Even more
significantly, Canada's Supreme Court has mandated that
special rules of evidence apply to allow the admission of
traditionally inadmissible evidence such as oral histories.7 One of
the goals in these opinions has been not so much to overturn
5. See, e.g., Delgamuukw v. The Queen [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (Can.); Van der Peet v.
The Queen [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (Can.); Sparrow v. The Queen [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (Can.);
Guerin v. The Queen [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 (Can.).
6. Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (Can.).
7. Delgamuukw [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1075, 1100-1101 (citing Van der Peet [19961 2
S.C.R. at 510).
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more than a century of judicial decisions but rather to open up a
means of truly incorporating aboriginal perspectives into the
work of the courts. As Canada's Supreme Court puts it, the
courts must accord due weight to aboriginal perspectives without
straining "the Canadian legal and constitutional structure."'
This approach has begun to engender not only a fresh
construction of property law but also a new-if yet
unarticulated-theory of history.
This Comment provides a brief account of what Canada's
Supreme' Court has meant by construing aboriginal title as sui
generis and explores the significance of this legal theory to the
construction of a commensurate historical theory. This Comment
does not, however, explore the intricacies of aboriginal histories
or dictate a specific complex historiography for courts to follow.
Rather, it calls attention to the necessity of courts' taking on a
more sophisticated and self-conscious approach to history.
Part II of this Comment provides a starting point for this
exploration in that it shows a contemporary court's imposing a
traditional western approach to history, an approach that
inevitably curtails or even extinguishes aboriginal rights. Part
III defines how Canadian courts have established aboriginal title
and explains their treatment of aboriginal rights as sui generis.
Part IV shows how the Canada Supreme Court's interpretation of
aboriginal rights as sui generis offers a model for writing history
more self-consciously and more thoroughly by foregrounding the
contiguities and mutualities of First Nations and European
histories. Part V considers whether some of this model might be
applicable to reservation disestablishment cases in the United
States.
Although it is up to the legislatures to shape progressive
Indian policy, the courts must approach traditional sources of
law in ways that provide a space for the First Nations to continue
to develop their autonomy and independence.9 So long as the
8. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. at 509.
9. This Comment assumes that courts aim to be governed by jurisprudential rather
than political motives, and proposes an alternative view of history that courts can
incorporate into their making principled decisions. In fact, for a court to make a
principled decision, it must invoke theories of history and narrative that are not
politically fixed; as Herbert Wecshler observed: "a principled decision... is one that rests
on reasons.. .that in their generality and neutrality transcend any immediate result that
is involved." HERBERT WECSHLER, PRINCIPLES, PoLITIcs, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 27
(1961).
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courts continue to view history in terms of treaties, legislative
directives, occupation, and use, the court system will fail to adopt
a truly alternative property model. By failing to adopt a new
historical paradigm along with the alternative property model,
the court system is digging the graves of aboriginal rights.
II. THE GITKSAN CASE AND THE OLD HISTORY
One of the most important aboriginal rights claims cases in
recent years, Delgamuukw v. The Queen, also known as the
Gitksan case, exemplifies how courts have failed to adopt a new
historical model commensurate with the Supreme Court of
Canada's definition of "aboriginal rights."" The Supreme Court of
Canada overruled the British Columbia court and set forth
specific guidelines on how the courts should adapt rules of
evidence to the special nature of aboriginal title claims.1 While
the Supreme Court made the essential observation that evidence
rules must be modified to be commensurate with this sui generis
property, its intelligent and bold opinion stopped short of offering
a critique of the pervasive western approach to history apparent
in the lower court's opinion. It is important to look at the
enormous work of the lower court to understand how a court's
construction of history shapes its findings and to explode some of
the misconceptions of a historical method that purports to be
hegemonic.
The case is unusual in many respects, most notably in that
individual chiefs, not tribes or officials of the Department of
Indian Affairs, were the plaintiffs pressing their claims and
presenting the histories of their Houses.1" In Delgamuukw, fifty-
one chiefs from two sub-groups of aboriginal peoples, the Gitksan
10. Delgamuukw v. The Queen [1991] 79 D.L.R.(4th) 185 (B.C.), af/d in part, [1993]
104 D.L.R. (4th) 470 (B.C. Ct. App.), rev'd in part, [19971 3 S.C.R. 1010 (Can.). For a
discussion of the appellate court's treatment of extinguishment of aboriginal rights, see
Bruce Ryder, Aboriginal Rights and Delgamuukw v. the Queen, 5 CONST. F. 43 (1994).
11. Delgamuukw v. The Queen [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (Can.). For a discussion of this
case and the Supreme Court's modifications of evidence rules in aboriginal rights cases,
see Part 111, below. See also Anthony DePalma, Canadian Indians Celebrate Vindication
of Their History, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1998, at Al.
12. Delgamuukw v. The Queen [1991] 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185, 203 (B.C.). Houses,
composed of several clans, are headed by a number of chiefs. For a discussion of the
history of the case and Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en perspectives on the litigation, see DON
MONET AND SKANu'u (ARDYTHE WILSON), COLONIALISM ON TRIAL: INDIGENOUS LAND
RIGHTS AND THE GITKSAN AND WET'SUWET'EN SOVEREIGNTY CASE (1992).
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and the Wet'suwet'en, claimed ownership and jurisdiction over
an area of some 58,000 square kilometers in British Columbia. 3
Although the chiefs conceded that the radical title was held by
the Crown, they contended that this title was burdened by
aboriginal rights.' They sought declaration of their ownership of
the land, or, in the alternative, aboriginal rights to use of the
territory. 5 They also sought damages for loss of lands and
resources transferred to third parties.' Additionally, they sought
declaration of the right to govern themselves in accordance with
their aboriginal laws. 7
The trial court found that the Indian chiefs failed to
demonstrate a claim based on occupancy and held that claims for
damages and self-governance should be dismissed. 8
Furthermore, the trial court concluded that all aboriginal rights
had been extinguished. 9 The court did, however, concede that
the Indians should be entitled to use "vacant Crown land for
aboriginal purposes subject to the laws of the province."" This
last finding was grounded in a "fiduciary obligation" of the
Crown, and not in any rights stemming from the tribes'
occupation of the territory.2
The trial court articulated both the necessity and the
difficulty of dealing with several kinds of histories. Justice
McEachern explicitly noted his frustration over how to pull
together the vast body of information before him, how to
determine what evidence to admit, and how to determine what
history to believe.2' He quoted the Ontario Court of Appeals'
dictum that "[clases on Indian or aboriginal rights can never be
determined in a vacuum. It is of importance to consider the
history and oral traditions of the tribes concerned, and
surrounding circumstances...."", McEachern also observed that
13. Delgamuukw [1991] 79 D.L.R. (4th) at 202-203.
14. Id. at 204. "Radical title" designates the underlying title to the land as held by
the Crown. Id. at 282.
15. Id. at 240-41.
16. Id. at 241.
17. Id. at 240.
18. Id. at 537.
19. Id. at 490.
20. Id. at 537.
21. Id. at 482.
22. Id. at 200.
23. Regina v. Taylor [1981] 34 O.R. (2d) 360, 364 (Ont. Ct. App.)
494 [Vol. 30:2
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"there are many relevant, interfluent histories."2' The court
attempted to finesse its way around this problem of multiplicity
by recognizing a sense of discomfort and ambivalence in its
enterprise.
McEachern's ambivalence points toward the necessity of
creating an alternative paradigm for viewing history in these
land claims cases. His analysis inevitably founders on
traditional methods of history, which tend to bind peoples to
their past rather than free them for self-determination.
Although the trial court is to be commended for its examination
of an enormous and various body of evidence, its Herculean
efforts nonetheless failed to reach the heart of the matter of
Indian land claims. The trial court, like courts before and after,
framed its approach to historical evidence in terms of a
traditional European model that aims to categorize and delineate
events rather than to establish a starting point for present-day
tribal self-determination. This traditional approach to history
both reflects and circuitously confirms the court's traditional
approach to property law, as McEachern noted: "I am sure that
the plaintiffs understand that although the aboriginal laws
which they recognize could be relevant on some issues, I must
decide this case only according to what they call 'the white man's
law,. 2
5
Although many aspects of the trial court's decision invite
analysis in terms of its limited approach to history, this
Comment calls attention to only three kinds of historical
problems: the court's structural, linguistic, and point-of-view
maneuvers that ultimately have frozen the aboriginal rights
claims in the past. The trial court stratified the histories of the
Gitksan, Wet'suwet'en, and European peoples into periods and
atomized history in terms of treaties presented from the colonial
perspective.
At the structural level, the court felt compelled to divide the
history of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples into three
divisions: pre-historic, proto-historic, and historic.26 The judge
explained that the difference between these periods is "relevant
24. Delgamuukw [19911 79 D.L.R. (4th) at 211.
25. Id. at 201.
26. Id. at 212-27. It should be noted that this division of history conforms to that set
out in earlier cases. See, e.g. Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs &
Northern Development [1979] 107 D.L.R. (3d) 513, 517-29 (Fed. Ct.).
1999] 495
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to the question of determining what are aboriginal as opposed to
non-aboriginal practices."27 An aboriginal right can be protected
only if it is proven not to have emerged as a result of European
settlement.28 "Pre-historic" preceded "proto-historic," which the
court defined as "the period before actual contact with
Europeans, but after European influences began to impact upon
aboriginal people."29 The historic period, according to this model,
did not begin until 1822 when a European trader documented the
activities of some of the Gitksan.3
On another level, the language that the court used to
describe how Indians and Europeans migrated and settled in the
territory reflects a strong bias toward a particular kind of
history. While purporting to respect the religions of the Indian
peoples, the court dismisses some Indians' belief that "God gave
this land to them at the beginning of time."' This could not be,
according to the court, because no one could have inhabited the
territory covered in ice during the Ice Age, an event that
occurred, of course, much after the beginning of time.2 The court
recognized that there was human presence in the area some
6,000 to 3,500 years ago, but concluded that it was sporadic.33
The account of the European discovery of America, thanks to
documentation, is less speculative. The judge opines with pride:
"Early in this continuum other great explorations were
underway, principally from Europe west and southward. 4
Magellan's expedition circumnavigated the globe in 1519-22, and
Drake sailed into the Pacific landing...." While Magellan's sea
journey is called "great," the miraculous foot journey of the
Indians gets buried in apologies and the presence of the
Canadian judge: "It is my conclusion, doing the best I can
without the assistance of very much evidence, that the plaintiffs'
ancestors, both Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en, migrated from Asia,
probably through Alaska, but not necessarily across the Bering
27. Delgamuukw [1991] 79 D.L.R. (4th) at 201.
28. This does not, however, require that the tribes perform these practices just as
their ancestors did during the "pre-historic" period. See id. at 212-27.
29. Id. at 220.
30. Id. at 222.
31. Id. at 212.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 213.
34. Id. at 215.
35. Id.
[Vol. 30:2
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Strait, after the last Ice Age, and spread south and west into the
areas which they found liveable."" When set beside the
description of the European discovery, the account of the Indian
migration seems litotes. Unfortunately, the author of the opinion
does not seem to recognize the sad irony.
Although the court recognizes that "there are many relevant,
interfluent histories," it nonetheless construes history from the
European perspective. The court recites events related to the
Europeans: gold rushes, Mormon immigration, small pox
epidemics, commercial activity, the arrival of the telegraph, and
the various political activities preceding British Columbia's
joining the Canadian Confederation.38 The court establishes no
connection between all this European activity and the movement
of the Indians, a movement that hurt their chances of showing
long-term and exclusive occupation. The court says only: "During
all this period the Indians were leaving the distant areas of the
territory to live in the villages in the transportation corridor.'3
Nor does the court mention at this point that Canadian
policy as set forth in the 1857 Civilizaton of Indian Tribes Act
was assimilation." In the process of delineating essential aspects
of "history" that speak to contemporary aboriginal rights, the
court gives short shrift to the "interfluence" of the histories. In
atomizing the historical events instead of foregrounding the
constant relations between Indians and Europeans, the court
creates a history of boundaries, which, in turn, ground
contemporary relationships in the somewhat arbitrary categories
established by the process of writing history and not by the
process of cultural development.41
36. Id. at 213.
37. Id. at 224-30.
38. Id. at 224.
39. Id. at 227.
40. CAN. STAT., ch. 26 (1857). See also Richard H. Bartlett, The Indian Act of
Canada, 27 BUFF. L. REV. 581, 582 (1978).
41. The trial court concludes the section on "The Historic Period" by quoting a
European trapper who recorded in his journal that "he had great difficulty getting the
Indians in his area to be as industrious in their trapping as he wished they would be."
Delgarnuukw [1991] 79 D.L.R. (4th) at 223.
1999] 497
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III. ABORIGINAL RIGHTS AND THE PROBLEM OF HISTORY
The problem of history begins with a look at the purpose of
history in aboriginal rights claims litigation. When Canadian
courts have considered whether an aboriginal right to land
continues to exist, they have looked to the traditional property
model of occupation and use.42 The right attaches to land
occupied and used by aboriginal peoples as their traditional home
prior to the assertion of sovereignty."43 The Supreme Court in
Delgamuukw, drawing on a tradition that stretches back to
Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs, sets forth
specific requirements for establishing aboriginal title:
(1) the land must have been occupied prior to sovereignty;
(2) if present occupation is relied on as proof of occupation
pre-sovereignty, there must be a continuity between
present and pre-sovereignty occupation; and
(3) at sovereignty, that occupation must have been
exclusive.44
The legal meaning of aboriginal title arose from the Indians'
historic occupation and possession of their tribal lands; that is,
they emerged from the European articulated possessory rights
that Indians held from time immemorial. 45
Before returning to the role of history in construing
aboriginal title, it is necessary to consider the development of the
42. Id. at 542.
43. Id.
44. Delgamuukw v. The Queen [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1097 (Can.). See also Hamlet of
Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs & Northern Development [1979] 107 D.L.R. (3d)
513, 542 (Fed. Ct.). A similar test applies in the United States. The Sac and Fox Tribe of
Indians of Oklahoma v. United States, 315 F.2d 896 (Ct. Cl. 1963)("aboriginal title must
rest on actual, exclusive, and continuous use and occupancy for a long time prior to the
loss of the property.").
45. Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia [1973] S.C.R. 313 (Can.). See
also Guerin v. The Queen [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 376-82 (Can.); Amodu Tijani v. Secretary,
Southern Nigeria, 2 A.C. 399 (P.C., 1921) (where change in sovereignty did not effect
change of presumptive title of inhabitants).
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doctrine of this property right as sui generis. One of the most
obvious ways that aboriginal title differs from traditional
common law concepts of property is that it is held collectively as
opposed to individually in fee simple. '  The second major
difference lies in how the right was created, essentially by the
collision of a European legal culture entering land possessed by
the First Nations. At that brief moment, no title existed in the
land. As time passed, title was constructed and imposed at the
hands of U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall, who
developed the notion of two kinds of title: radical title held by the
sovereign and a possessory right, held by the First Nations
occupying the land at the time of discovery. 7 As Justice
Marshall explained in the famous case, Johnson v. M'Intosh,
"discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by
whose authority, it was made, against all other European
governments, which title might be consummated by possession. '
The discovery doctrine also reflected the third aspect of the
special nature of aboriginal title, its inalienability. First Nations
could continue to occupy the land, but discovery vested an
"exclusive right to purchase" in the discoverer.49 This doctrine of
discovery emerged to stave off conflicts between European
nations, not between Europeans and Indians."
Courts in both Canada and the United States relied on the
Royal Proclamation of 1763 to buttress the discovery doctrine."
Ostensibly, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 did not aim to affect
aboriginal rights; the purpose of the proclamation was to protect
the Indians by insulating them from the white settlers."2 The
46. Delgamuukw v. The Queen [19971 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1082-83.
47. The doctrine of discovery was first articulated by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Johnson and Graham's Lesee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823),
and later adopted, with limitation, in Canada's first important Indian claims case, St.
Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen [18881 14 App. Cas. 46 (P.C.). It was
not until Calder that Canada's courts extended the existence of aboriginal rights to
antedate the Royal Proclamation of 1763. Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia
[1973], S.C.R. 313.
48. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 573.
49. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 546 (1832). See also Joseph William
Singer, Well Settled?: The Increasing Weight of History in American Indian Land Claims,
28 GA. L. REV., 481, 490 (1994).
50. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 572-74, 596-97; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
at 544. See also Singer, supra note 49, at 490.
51. The first and most famous case to explore this relationship was Johnson V.
M'Intosh. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 572-74, 596-97
52. Id.
19991
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document itself suggests this purpose; the preamble recognized
that "great Frauds and Abuses have been committed in
purchasing Lands of the Indians, to the great Prejudice of our
Interest and to the great Dissatisfaction of the said Indians.""
The Proclamation proscribed British subjects from making
purchases, taking possession, or making settlements of reserved
lands.54 After European discovery and the Royal Proclamation,
the kind of property right remaining in the First Nations is "a
right held by a collective, a right that cannot be alienated other
than by the Crown, that is, held at the pleasure of the Crown. '
The issue of aboriginal rights in Canada took on new
significance in 1982 when Canada "recognized and affirmed" the
"existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples of
Canada."56 Although this legislation did not establish new rights,
it provided constitutional protection of any rights that could be
proven to exist prior to the adoption of the Act.57 Those wishing
to assert claims based on aboriginal rights had to prove (1) that
the aboriginal rights existed in 1982 when this Act was adopted
into the Constitution, and (2) what those aboriginal rights were."
The courts in Canada have struggled to find some harmony
in the coexistence of aboriginal rights and Canadian radical
53. Royal Proclamation of 1763, R.S.C., app. II, No. 1 (Can. 1985). The Proclamation
reserved for the use of the Indians, "all the land and territories lying to the westward of
the sources of the rivers which fall into the sea from the west and northwest" (that is,
stretching from southern Ontario to the Gulf of Mexico, from the Appalachian Mountains
west to the Mississippi River). Id.
54. Id. See also PETER A. CUMMING & NEIL H. MICKENBERG, NATIVE RIGHTS IN
CANADA, 70, 71 (2d ed. 1971). Within twenty years of the Proclamation, however, the
white population was on the increase, and the British government purchased lands from
the Indians for settlement and military establishments. By the 1830s, Canada was
stripping the indigenous peoples of their land and installing them on reservations,
purportedly to help Indians assimilate to the white culture. See Johnson, supra note 3, at
667-69.
55. St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen [1888114 App. Cas. 46, 54
(P.C.). See also Smith v. The Queen [1983] 1 S.C.R. 554, 561-63.
56. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) R.S.C., app. II, No. 44, Sec. 35(1)(1985).
57. Id. For discussions of the effects of the 1982 act, see Noel Lyon, An Essay on
Constituional Interpretation, 26 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 95 (1988); William Pentney, The
Rights of Aboriginal Peoples in Canada in the Constitution Act, 1982, Part II, Section 35:
The Substantive Guarantee, 22 U.B.C. L. REV. 207 (1987); Brian Slattery, Understanding
Aboriginal Rights, 66 CAN. BAR REV. 726 (1987).
58. Aboriginal rights play a much more significant role in Canada litigation than in
the United States because the United States land settlement relied much more heavily on
treaties, which delineated the rights and responsibilities of the respective parties. See
Johnson, supra note 3, at 683.
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title." On the one hand, the courts have found a consistency of
radical title burdened by aboriginal rights; they cite the famous
Australian case, Mabo v. Queensland:
Recognition of the radical title of the Crown is quite consistent
with recognition of native title to land, for the radical title,
without more, is merely a logical postulate required to support
the doctrine of tenure (when the Crown has exercised its
sovereign power to grant an interest in land) and to support
the plenary title of the Crown (when the Crown has exercised
its sovereign power to appropriate to itself ownership of
60parcels of land within the Crown's territory).
On the other hand, and more importantly, the courts have
wrestled with ways to construe aboriginal title so that it does not
conflict with radical title; the courts rescue the coexistence of
title by trying to define aboriginal rights as a form of property
outside the bounds of traditional property theory. 1
Even as the courts try to stretch outside of traditional law to
account for aboriginal rights, they are forced to find some legal
pigeonhole in which to house these rights so that, at the very
least, the judicial system can generate a legal position to
determine and grant compensatory damages." While construing
aboriginal rights as legal, the Supreme Court in Guerin set forth
two aspects of Indian title: (1) that it is a personal interest,
inalienable other than to the Crown, and (2) that it also consists
of a fiduciary obligation on the part of the Crown.63 Six years
later in Sparrow, the Supreme Court upheld Guerin's
characterization of aboriginal title as sui generis.4 In neither
59. See Sparrow v. The Queen [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (Can.); Guerin v. The Queen
[1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 (Can.); Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia [1973] S.C.R.
313 (Can.).
60. Mabo v. Queensland, 107 A.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1992), quoted in Delgamuukw v. The
Queen [19931 104 D.L.R. (4th) 470, 493 (B.C. Ct. App.).
61. See Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; Guerin [19841 2 S.C.R. 335.
62. Guerin in particular confronts this problem. The Supreme Court of Canada was
careful to construe the Crown's fiduciary obligation to the First Nations as a private trust,
not a public one, so that the aboriginal rights claim at issue fell within the legal system's
ambit. Guerin [1984] 2 S.C.R. at 375-89. The Court took this stand to counter the
Government's argument that the trust was political and therefore properly dealt with in
political fora. Id. at 375-76, 384-85. The Court identifies the sources of the "political
trust" doctrine: Kinlock v. Secretary of State for India in Council, 7 App. Cas. 619 (H.L.,
1882), and Tito v. Wadell (No. 2), 3 All E.R. 129 (Ch., 1977). Id. at 375-79.
63. Guerin [19841 2 S.C.R. at 382.
64. Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
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Guerin nor Sparrow, however, did the Court have to determine
what conditions established aboriginal title over land."5 Guerin
and Sparrow required later courts to recognize the special nature
of aboriginal rights, but neither case established a set of rules or
even observations to guide later courts in determining whether
aboriginal rights over land existed. Thus a later court, such as
the British Columbia court analyzing the Gitksan claims,
returned to Baker Lake and its traditional occupation-and-use
definition of property rights.66
Today, Canadian courts regard "aboriginal rights," which
include the more specific "aboriginal title," as "rights arising from
ancient occupation or use of land, to hunt, fish, take game
animals, wood, berries and other foods and materials for
sustenance and generally to use the lands in the manner they
say their ancestors used them. ' As the court in Sparrow pointed
out, these rights are "held by a collective and are in keeping with
the culture and existence of that group."8 As this definition
implies, "aboriginal rights" were not explicitly accounted for in
treaties, and were not thwarted by European' claims of
sovereignty.69 Aboriginal title is, according to the Supreme
Court, "grounded both in the common law and in the aboriginal
perspective on land."" As such, both the aboriginal perspective
and the common law must be considered in determining whether
aboriginal title exists.7
Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Van der Peet laid down
two principles that aim to give due weight to aboriginal
perspectives without straining "the Canadian legal and
constitutional structure.""2 The two principles are:
(1) trial courts must approach the rules of evidence in light of
the evidentiary difficulties inherent in adjudicating aboriginal
claims, and
65. In Guerin, the land involved was part of an Indian reserve in Vancouver. Guerin
[1984] 2 S.C.R. at 339-40. In Sparrow, the issue turned on aboriginal rights to fish.
Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 1076.
66. See Delgamuukw v. The Queen, [1991] 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185, 455 (B.C.).
67. Id.; see also Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs & Northern
Development [1979] 107 D.L.R. (3d) 513 (Fed. Ct.); JACK WOODWARD, NATIVE LAW (1990).
68. Sparrow at 1112.
69. See Calder v. A.-G. B.C. [1973] S.C.R. 313, 390 (Can.)(J. Hall, dissenting).
70. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1099-1100.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1066 (quoting Van der Peet v. The Queen [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, 509 (Can.)).
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(2) trial courts must interpret that evidence in the same
spirit."
In reviewing the Gitksan case, the Court applied these
principles to how the trial court valued-or undervalued, by
giving them no independent weight-the oral histories of the
Gitksan and the Wet'suwet'en.7 ' The Supreme Court went to
great lengths to explain the uniqueness and evidentiary
significance of these oral histories, quoting the Report of the
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples:
The Aboriginal tradition in the recording of history is neither
linear nor steeped in the same notion of social progress and
evolution [as in the non-Aboriginal tradition]. Nor is it
usually human centered in the same way as in the western
scientific tradition, for it does not assume that human beings
are anything more than one-and not necessarily the most
important-element of the natural order of the universe.
... [T]here are many histories, each characterized in part by
how a people see themselves, how they define their identity in
relation to their environment, and how they express their
uniqueness as a people. 5
The Court held that rules of evidence must be adapted so
that such evidence can have "an equal footing with the types of
historical evidence that courts are familiar with, which largely
consists of historical documents." 6  With this equal footing
requirement in mind, the Court ordered a new trial to overcome
the trial court's errors in failing to assess oral histories
properly.77
As remarkable and useful as are the Supreme Court's
principles mandating admission and weighty consideration of
oral histories, they are limited in that they focus only on the oral
histories and perspectives of the First Nations. For a truly sui
generis history commensurate with the sui generis nature of
aboriginal rights, courts must also reflect on how they read
73. Delgamuukw [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1066 (citing Cramer v. United States 261 U.S.
219 (1923)).
74. Delgamuukw [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1073.
75. Id. at 1067-68 (quoting LOOKING FORWARD LOOKING BACK, 1 REPORT OF THE
ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES 33 (1996)).
76. Delgamuukw [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1069.
77. Id. at 1079.
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traditional western sources of history. These courts must at least
consider importing to some extent the historical theory lying
beyond oral histories, that is, a multiplicity of histories that serve
to define identity and how peoples express their uniqueness.
IV. THE INCOMMENSURATENESS OF Sui GENERIS TITLE AND
TRADITIONAL MODES OF HISTORY
A. The Problem of History in Construing
Aboriginal Rights
Although the Supreme Court of Canada generated the
beginnings of a non-traditional approach to aboriginal rights, its
approach stumbles on the question of land claims for at least two
reasons. First, defining aboriginal rights as outside of traditional
property law and within the realm of a fiduciary relationship
does not help a court determine whether a First Nation has a
legal claim to land. Secondly, the Supreme Court has laid out no
model for how to use history in construing aboriginal rights.
This combination of weaknesses has left the judicial system to
return to traditional, European property rights as set forth in
Baker Lake and to traditional, European methods of history."8 In
turn, this traditional approach entangles contemporary courts in
the colonial pattern of Europeans' laying down borders that
indicate the rights and place of the First Nations." The courts
end up packaging histories of peoples in clearly demarcated
containers for the purpose of delineating tidy borders.
Following the lead of the U.S. courts and the four factors set
forth in Baker Lake, Canadian courts have relied on historical
78. See, e.g., Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs & Northern
Development [1979] 107 D.L.R. (3d) 513, 517-29 (Fed. Ct.).
79. One of the plaintiffs' attorneys in the Gitksan case, Michael Jackson, decried the
Court's choosing history on the basis of "economic imperatives":
the economic imperatives of European colonization give rise to legal
imperatives in which Indian rights are extinguished without Indian consent
and without compensation. Whereas the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en sought to
place their court cast in the larger context of history, the judgment of the
Chief Justice dissociates itself from that history, asserting that events and
treaties made elsewhere with other First Nations peoples bear no relationship
to what happened 'on the ground' in British Columbia.
MONET & SKANUJU, supra note 12, at xi. While recognizing this aspect of the Chief
Justice's failure to consider all the history making up the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en
claims, this Comment is limited to how the Court viewed particular facts.
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analysis to determine whether aboriginal rights continued to
exist prior to the 1982 constitutional amendment. Thus, the
courts' assessments of history have determined whether tribes
will win their claims to property, either in land or rights. The
courts' assessments of history have determined whether the
tribes will gain property that the western legal system construes
as fundamental to liberty and autonomy. It has been the courts'
very construction of history, however, that sometimes
perpetuates the deprivation of liberty and autonomy that
previous generations had wrought on the First Nations.
History is narrative, and in the legal system the fact-finder
is the narrator, the creator of the narrative.0 History itself is but
legend that "provides the imaginary dimension that we need so
that the elsewhere can reiterate the very here and now."' Given
the nature of history, the fact-finder, either consciously or
unconsciously, inevitably bumps into trouble in trying to
distinguish its perspective from the materials that it analyzes.
Inevitably, any history is but an iteration of the present, and its
narrative "has eliminated otherness and its dangers in order to
retain only those fragments of the past which are locked into the
puzzle of present time."82  Given the disparity between
contemporary and colonial perspectives, between aboriginal and
European perspectives, it is virtually impossible for anyone, no
matter how well-meaning, to create a competent historical
narrative.
But try the courts must, and one approach starts with the
courts' reconsideration of the purposes of history within
aboriginal claims litigation. The central issue in these claims is
property rights. Although "property rights" were non-existent for
the ancestors of today's First Nations, property rights are
fundamental to western views of liberty as specifically
articulated in both Canadian and U.S. courts." Despite some
efforts-both judicial and academic-to foster a notion of liberty
distinct from property rights, the right to private property, "in
respect of which the State is neutral, is fundamental to moral
development and dignity."84 Given property's primacy in relation
80. MICHEL DE CERTEAU, THE WRITING OF HISTORY 287 (Tom Conley, trans., 1988).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
84. Vis-A-vis aboriginal rights, Professor Trakman has summarized contemporary
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to liberty, aboriginal rights claims-that is, claims to property
that could never have been imagined by the first Native
Americans-inevitably reflect First Nations' belated attempts to
secure liberty and sovereignty within the western negative rights
regime. 5 Thus, one purpose of the claims is to assert liberty and
sovereignty; one purpose of the narrative of history is to
determine whether those First Nations are entitled to liberty and
sovereignty.
B. The Dominant Property Model: Liberalism and
Individual Rights
Fundamental to western ideas of liberty and selfhood has
been the enduring concept of private property, that bastion over
which the individual exercises exclusive control, that stake that
both motivates and enables a man to participate in the body
politic." The right to own property has thus been viewed as basic
to a person's social and moral identity.7 According to the liberal,
deontological view of property, "a right to private property, in
respect of which the State is neutral, is fundamental to moral
development and dignity."8 Given the primacy of property to
selfhood in western thought, it follows that a First Nation might
gain dignity and autonomy in the western world by finding a
place in the western property system. In a sense, that is just
what some of the courts, plaintiffs, and legislators have been
trying to do in Canada.
To find a place for the First Nations in the western property
system, the First Nations and the judicial system must take on
the fossilized western approach to history. Although plaintiffs in
views of property and has called for "reconceiving... Western liberal conceptions of rights
in light of responsibilities." Leon E. Trakman, Native Cultures in a Rights Empire
Ending the Dominion, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 189, 195 (1997).
85. It should be noted that the Chiefs in the Gitksan case sought to establish self-
governance and sovereignty. See Delgamuukw v. The Queen [1991] 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185,
240.
86. See Trakman supra note 84. See also John Lawrence Hill, Law and the Concept
of the Core Self. Toward a Reconciliation of Naturalism and Humanism, 80 MARQ. L. REV.
289 (1997); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
87. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 86.
88. Trakman, supra note 84, at 200. See also JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967). For a survey of the liberal views of
property, see also LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILosoPIuC FOUNDATIONS
(1977); ALAN RYAN, PROPERTY AND POLITICAL THEORY (1986).
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the Gitksan case attempted to introduce the western court to a
different worldview and approach to history by presenting their
own kinds of histories, their cause failed in that the court refused
to interpret those histories in ways other than the traditional
western schoolboy approach. 9 Courts cannot continue to apply
an old model of history to a new interpretation of property. Much
as the courts moved away from trying to define aboriginal rights
in terms of occupation and use, the courts may and should move
away from an historical theory that aims to demarcate borders,
spaces, and rights.
C. Property, Liberty, and History
Although the Canadian courts have recognized aboriginal
rights as a sui generis property right, these courts continue to
apply traditional historical models to determine just what those
non-Western aboriginal rights are. Just as the courts have taken
to rejecting "exclusivity" as a prerequisite for establishing
aboriginal rights, so should they reject exclusivity's historical
corollary, that is, demarcating history in terms of treaties,
political directives, and territorial boundaries. A more fruitful
and just approach lies in examining histories, both aboriginal
and European, in terms of their expressions of developing
autonomous or sovereign wills. The courts need to reconstruct
histories from a forward-looking present position, one that will
enable each nation and people to choose and shape its telos in
relationship to other nations.
The Supreme Court of Canada has itself opened the door to
an alternative mode of constructing history when it defined
aboriginal rights as sui generis, as somehow existing outside the
strictures of traditional property law.9" Although it redefines
these rights, the Supreme Court nonetheless manages to place
aboriginal rights within the traditional property scheme by
emphasizing the fiduciary relationship of the Crown to the First
Nations. Likewise, the courts can and should place aboriginal
history within their historical reconstructions so that judicial
89. In his opening statement, counsel for plaintiffs, Stuart Rush, challenged the
court "to hear all this evidence, in all its compledty, in all its elaboration, as the
articulation of a way of looking at the world which pre-dates the Canadian Constitution
by many thousands of years." MONET & SKANU'U, supra note 12, at 26.
90. See discussion supra, Part III.
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assessment of aboriginal claims reflects the same policy that the
fiduciary obligation espouses.
History potentially provides an apt vehicle for affirming
liberty and sovereignty through property litigation. Even while
the history that the court narrates ultimately determines
property, that same history can transcend the property issue to
point toward elements of liberty and sovereignty that existed
separate from, and perhaps antecedent to, the existence of
property in the western world. The creation of the historical
narrative takes on two goals, not only that of determining
property but also that of determining liberty and sovereignty.
Adoption of two principles of historical interpretation would help
the courts to assess aboriginal rights more equitably in terms of
liberty and sovereignty: (1) apply by analogy the fiduciary
relationship resulting from organic aboriginal rights to the
activity of historical interpretation and (2) foreground the
contiguities and mutualities of the Canadian government's
history and the histories of the First Nations.
The Guerin and Sparrow courts' elaboration of the
government's fiduciary obligation to First Nations provides a
parallel for how the judicial system might attempt to read the
histories concerning these same aboriginal rights. According to
the Guerin court, the source of the Crown's fiduciary obligation
lies in the "sui generis nature of Indian title and the historic
powers and responsibility assumed by the Crown.""' Sparrow
foregrounded "the special trust relationship and the
responsibility of the government vis-h-vis aboriginal people" as
"the first consideration in determining whether the legislation
[extinguishing aboriginal rights] can be justified."92 Just as the
Supreme Court mandated that the courts must consider the First
Nations' perspective on aboriginal rights,93 so must the courts
consider history from the First Nations' point of view and
interweave that perspective with the European view of history.
A reconsideration of the Gitksan trial court's approach to
history can demonstrate this approach to the relationship
between Canada's legislation and aboriginal rights. For example,
when the trial court looked at evidence to decide whether the
91. Sparrow v. The Queen [19901 1 S.C.R. 1075, 1108 (Can.).
92. Id. at 1079.
93. Id. at 1112; see discussion supra, Part III.
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Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples had inhabited any area
continuously and exclusively, the court observed that the Indians
were migrating into the villages. ' If the court were to follow the
logic of the imperatives laid down in Guerin and Sparrow, the
court should evaluate the impact of European movement and
legislation on the First Nations and how the First Nations
maintained aspects of their sovereignty while accommodating the
European intrusions.
Looking at the interrelationship of the European and
aboriginal histories would also obviate the problems stemming
from dividing history into three periods (pre-historical, proto-
historical, and historical). Instead of construing aboriginal rights
almost purely in terms of pre-European aboriginal existence, the
courts need to be more open to observing the relationship of the
Crown's policies to First Nations' development and settlement.
For example, at the time that the First Nations were migrating
to the villages, Canada was doggedly pursuing a policy of
assimilation.95 The purpose of this assimilation was "to introduce
indigenous people to the dominant society's form of government,
and inculcate a spirit of individuality in place of the communal
life and hereditary leadership of the traditional past."" As the
1983 Special Committee on Indian Self-Government noted, in all
the history of Indian Affairs in Canada, a policy of self-
determination was never seriously considered." In effect,
Canada's government was attempting to annihilate all incidents
of First Nations' sovereignty. Even in this environment,
however, certain aspects of First Nations' sovereignty and
identity survived.
To incorporate the First Nations' perspective, the courts need
to map a better plan for analyzing and weighing aboriginal
histories such as the chiefs' presentation of their ada'ox in the
Gitksan trial. Ada'ox, roughly translated, are collections of
"histories, the origins of names, maps, sagas, symbols, myths,
laws, geneologies, social rank and duties."9 For example, during
the trial, Chief Tenimgyet presented an account of a lion's
94. Delgamuukw v. The Queen [1991] 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185, 227 (B.C.).
95. See Johnson, supra note 3.
96. Id. at 668-69. See also Bartlett, supra note 40.
97. Canada House of Commons, Special Committee on Indian Self-Government,
Indian Self-Government in Canada 13, 42 (1983).
98. Land-claims Testimony Proves Private Ordeal for Native Chief, VANCOUVER SUN,
Mar. 23, 1988.
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journey up the Skeena River until it "devoured a weeping woman
and threatened the countryside until it was chased into the river
and was drowned."99 This ada'ox laid out important geographical
histories of the Gitksan settlements."' Equally important,
however, is the ada'ox demonstration of longheld aboriginal
conceptions of land. Although the trial court admitted ada'ox, it
had little means of interpreting it in a way that could buttress or
diminish aboriginal rights claims. The Supreme Court has begun
to remedy this situation, but the courts need to continue to
develop theories and standards of how to use aboriginal histories
such as ada'ox.
V. A MODEL THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD FOLLOW?
The U.S. Supreme Court practices a more subtle and yet
even more damning historiography.' While acknowledging the
uglier sides of broken promises, broken treaties, and ham-fisted
negotiation, the Supreme Court ultimately wrings its hands,
shrugs its shoulders, and laments: "although '[slome might wish
[Congress] had spoken differently, we cannot remake history.'"'1 2
The expression of regret concludes a decision in which the Court
reversed the Eighth Circuit's recognition of the original
boundaries of the Yankton Sioux Reservation according to the
1858 Treaty, despite intervening allotment and domination by
non-Indian settlers!0 3 At issue was whether state or stricter
federal environmental regulations applied to the construction of
a waste disposal site on land located within the 1858 Reservation
boundaries. The state of South Dakota argued that the
Reservation had been diminished by Congressional ratification of
an agreement by which the Sioux allowed the United States to
sell surplus Reservation land that had not been allotted to
individual Indians. Certainly Article I of the Agreement
specified that the Sioux "hereby cede, sell, relinquish, and convey
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Milner Ball, Constitution, Court, and Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 3 (1987), Rennard Strickland, Dances With Lawyers: Wolves, Judges, and Other
Medicine Men, 69 TEX. L. REV. 995 (1991); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN
INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSE OF CONQUEST (1990).
102. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 357 (1998) (quoting
DeCoteau v. District County Court for Tenth Judicial District, 420 U.S. 425, 449 (1975)).
103. See Yankton Sioux Tribe Southern Missouri Waste Management District, 99
F.3d 1439 (1995).
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to the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest in
and to all the unallotted lands within the limits of the
reservation."""4 And Article II stipulates that the United States
would pay $600,000 to the tribe.0 5 The Agreement concludes,
however, with an affirmation of the 1858 Treaty that had
established the Reservation:
Nothing in this agreement shall by construed to abrogate the
treaty of April 19th, 1858, between the Yankton tribe of Sioux
Indians and the United States. And after the signing of this
agreement, and its ratification by Congress, all provisions of
the said treaty of April 19', 1858, shall be in force and effect,
the same as though this agreement had not been made, and
the said Yankton Indians shall continue to receive their
annuities under the said treaty of April 19', 1858. '06
The Supreme Court determined that this "savings clause"
was mere affirmation that the Indians would continue to receive
their annuities, and that the more specific language of Articles I
and II governed the general terms of the savings clause."7
Having made such a finding, the Court was then able to conclude
that the language of the Agreement, the historical context
surrounding its ratification, and subsequent circumstances
indicated that Congress had intended to diminish the
Reservation.
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court said that it
could not "remake history," but we cannot but hear a note of
disingenuousness or misleading naivete. Of course, on the most
basic level, the Supreme Court "remakes history" on a regular
basis every time it hears a case and writes its own "factual"
narrative."' And inevitably each Justice brings a different
reading horizon to each case, reading and hearing each case
through the lens of his or her own experiences and
perspectives. It is dangerous for the Court to ignore or forget
104. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 337.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 338.
107. Id. at 347-48.
108. See, e.g., Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUPR.
CT. REv. 119 (1965); CHARLES MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HIsToRY
(1969).
109. Without recourse to sophisticated readership theory, it is not difficult to
understand that an audience, as much as a narrator or author, creates the text. For
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the significant role of their own perspectives. It is disingenuous
for them to say that they have no power to make a text.
Ironically, the Yankton Sioux case itself begins with such a
creative moment: the Court says that it must determine
Congressional intent with respect to disestablishment of the 1858
Reservation boundaries even though the 1894 Congress clearly
had never contemplated disestablishment when it ratified any of
the surplus land sales of Indian Reservations. At the time of the
General Allotment Act of 1887,"0 Congress had two or three
goals: to acquire land for white settlers moving west, to
assimilate the Indians so that the "Indian problem" would go
away, or to assimilate the Indians so that they would become just
like their white neighbors by holding land in fee and farming.'11
The land sales following the General Allotment Act of 1887
reflected these goals. Indian fees were scattered patchwork
throughout the former Reservations, ostensibly with the purpose
of benefiting the Indians by close contact with non-Indians,"2 but
in reality this division of land hampered Indians' maintaining
traditional ways or uniting as a group to challenge white
migration. The division of the Yankton Reservation was no
different. As one of the U.S. Commissioners to the Agreement
negotiations reported-and as the Supreme Court quoted in its
opinion--"now that [members of the Tribe] have been allotted
their lands in severalty and have sold their surplus land-the
last property bond which assisted to hold them together in their
tribal interest and estate-their tribal interests may be
considered a thing of the past."13 Congress envisioned an
assimilation of Indians and non-Indians, an assimilation that
would render Reservation boundaries irrelevant. That assimila-
example, the beauty of Tolstoy is lost on a reader with little experience of human
relationships; the sophisticated reader, on the other hand, consciously or unconsciously
draws on his experiences to create a rich text full of stunning nuance. Thus the intellect
and imagination of the reader is as important as the imagination and skill of the writer;
together, author and reader create texts. See WOLFGANG ISER, THE ACT OF READING
(1978).
110. The General Allotment Act, or Dawes Act, as it is also known, was passed in
1887 and authorized the Secretary of the Interior to deed parcels of reserve land to
individual Indians and arrange the sale of "surplus land," that is, the remaining reserve
land that had not been allotted to Indians. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 658-61.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 658-60.
113. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 353 (1998).
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tion, however, did not take place as imagined. Congressional
intent was ultimately foiled.
Although the Supreme Court recognized that the Yankton
case "presented [Congress] with questions that [the Allotment
Acts] architects could not have foreseen," it nonetheless insisted
on dredging up some kind of Congressional intent with respect to
disestablishment.' In a series of cases, the Court erected a legal
fiction of Congressional intent regarding disestablishment that
could be determined by considering three factors: (1) the
language of the Congressional Act ratifying the Agreement at
issue, (2) the historical context of the passage of the statute, and
(3) the subsequent treatment of the area in question and the
pattern of settlement there."1 5
As noted above, the Court decided that the statute ratifying
the Yankton Agreement plainly indicated Congressional intent to
diminish. In reaching this conclusion, the Court looked behind
the face of the document to figure out how to reconcile Articles I
and II, seemingly a complete cession of rights, with the saving
clause of Article XVIII, which seemed to preserve the rights of
the 1858 Treaty. To understand-or to explain-the conflict, the
Court produced some history of the negotiations to the
Agreement. The records of the negotiations indicated that the
U.S. delegation threatened to take away the annuities of money,
food, clothing, and weapons, a threat especially powerful as
floods alternated with droughts, and hunger and disease were
spreading throughout the Reservation.1 6 These annuities had
been guaranteed by the 1858 Treaty. The Indians wanted the
United States to honor its previous promises, and it is natural to
assume that in the face of broken promises and threats of more
broken promises the Yankton would repeatedly seek
reassurances. Ultimately these concerns became part of the 1852
Agreement, which included a guarantee that their annuities
would continue to be paid, thus explicitly reiterating part of the
1858 Treaty.
Part of the 1858 Treaty-the boundaries-apparently
received no mention in the negotiation records. The Supreme
114. Id. at 343-44. Congress assumed that the notion of the reservation would fade
and did not contemplate that ownership of tribal land would not be coextensive with
reservation status. Id. at 343.
115. Id. at 344 (quoting Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 411 (1994)).
116. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe 522 U.S. at 346-47.
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Court read this lacuna as meaning that the Indians had little
concern about those boundaries. But such a reading is too
simplistic. This gap could have any number of explanations, the
only clear one being that the boundary question appears not to
have been an issue, or at least not an issue to the U.S.
delegation's reporter. If the boundaries were not at issue, it
seems more likely that the boundaries were assumed not to have
changed, that the Reservation would remain intact. Such a
reading seems as likely, or more likely, than the Supreme Court's
reading, especially considering the subsequent treatment of the
Reservation land: on some U.S. maps and in some statutes
written after the Agreement, it was still called the Yankton
Reservation." 7  Regardless of why the boundaries were not
mentioned in the Agreement negotiation records, the Court must
be cognizant of its imputing a certain narrative onto the events of
1892. Only with this self-consciousness can it legitimately write
its histories.
What theory should the Supreme Court use when it is
dealing with the complicated and vexing issues of
disestablishment? Like the Canadian Supreme Court, it should
look to the special nature of the law that it is applying and
generate a commensurate theory of history. In the United
States, there is, of course, no sui generis aboriginal right, and the
Supreme Court is wedded to the idea of individual rights as
opposed to group rights, but the Court can nonetheless observe
the special nature of Indian land claims in the United States. As
discussed above, courts around the world have recognized the
coexistence, seemingly irrational, of radical title and aboriginal
title. These courts have derived and developed their law of
aboriginal rights from the foundation that U.S. Supreme Court
Chief Justice John Marshall laid down in the early nineteenth
century: the discovery doctrine gave conquering Europeans
radical title while allowing Indians to maintain their possessory
interest.""
This dual nature of title should provide fodder for
determining a theory of history that intelligently embraces two
kinds of title. Courts in the United States might be wise to
consider the work begun by Marshall and picked up by courts
117. Id. at 351-56.
118. See discussion supra, Part III.
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around the world, most notably the Supreme Court of Canada, to
devise a theory of history that more accurately and fairly
represents the histories of tribes, land sales, and treaties.
Although it is unlikely that the United States will soon recognize
group rights or suspend rules of hearsay to admit such evidence
as oral histories, it can develop more appropriate theories of
history to deal with Indian land issues. Already the U.S.
Supreme Court says that it must construe ambiguities in treaties
in favor of the Indians."9 Traditionally, the Court has grounded
this rule of construction in favoring the party whose native
language was not the English of the agreements. This rule of
construction should also be grounded on an assumption that,
where silent, the parties to these sales agreements intended to
maintain the status quo and the long tradition of recognizing the
coexistence of radical and possessory titles. Such an approach to
law and the histories underlying it would allow courts to exercise
equity in a way that might prevent alternative nightmares from
happening: either harsh deprivation of Indian rights or harsh
deprivation of land rights that descendents of Europeans have
come to rely on. Discounting Indian histories or laying them out
only to lament a sad but inevitable situation serves neither
justice nor the long-term needs of all citizens of the United
States.
At least one district court has indicated that it will not
tolerate history-making dependent on gap-filling when the
United States is the only one holding the records. In February,
1999, Judge Royce C. Lamberth of the Federal District Court in
Washington, held the Secretaries of the Treasury and Interior in
contempt for failing to produce records of trust funds generated
from oil, gas, and timber leases for the benefit of some members
of the Blackfeet Nation. 2 According to government officials, the
records have been lost, or, in the case of some Albuquerque
documents, "contaminated with rat feces that could contain the
hantavirus.""' What the court will do if the documents fail to be
produced remains to be seen, but it is apparent that this court
"cannot tolerate any more empty promises."'22 Perhaps Judge
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Lamberth will find himself carving out new theories of history in
order to apply trust law with fairness and justice.
VI. CONCLUSION
The historical approach of the courts in Canada and the
United States has been limited in that it inscribes clear
boundaries on events, seeks concrete evidence in the form of
written documentation often kept only by the non-aboriginal
parties, and fails to emphasize the dynamism of relations
between First Nations and non-aboriginal people. Ultimately,
this approach renders us all servants to the past, objects of
history rather than subjects of our present. By construing
histories in terms of relationships between peoples, the courts
might both affirm the sovereignty of First Nations and show the
western system an alternative view of liberty. The judiciary's
failure to become self-conscious about its historical project is
dangerous for both First Nations and people of European
descent. As Friedrich Nietzsche has observed: "when history
serves past life so as to undermine further and especially higher
life, when the historical sense no longer preserves life but
mummifies it: then the tree dies unnaturally, beginning at the
top and slowly dying toward the roots-and in the end the root
itself generally decays."123
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